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AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STUDENT-ATHLETE
ACADEMIC ELIGIBILITY AND THE FUTURE
IMPLICATIONS OF CURETON v. NCAA
MICHAEL J. MONDELLO*
AMY M. ABERNETHY**

I.

INTRODUCTION

From the moment universities began sponsoring intercollegiate athletics, administrators have debated what academic standards,
if any, should be implemented to correct the dubious reputation
that college athletes are not serious students.' Beginning with the
inception of Proposition 482 in 1983, numerous proposals have
been forwarded by an assortment of individuals associated with collegiate athletics to function as benchmarks for freshmen academic
eligibility. Since then, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") has initiated, legislated and enforced these academic
measures to silence the growing number of negative perceptions
targeted toward student-athletes. In an attempt to eliminate the
stereotypical "dumb jock" image, the NCAA has consistently raised
the academic requirements for today's student-athletes competing
at major universities. The NCAA's most recent attempt at legislat* Assistant Professor of Sport Management, Florida State University. University of South Florida, B.S.; University of Florida, M.E.S.S.; University of Florida,
Ph.D. The author wishes to thank Amy Abernethy who demonstrated an incredible ability to balance her current and future family and who tolerated excessive
phone calls and e-mails during the completion of this article.
** University of Miami, B.A.; University of Florida,J.D.; University of Florida,
Ph.D. The author dedicates this article to her husband, John, for his constant
encouragement and support during the writing of this article, and to her children,
Emily, John and Sarah, who really tried to go to bed on time so she could finish
writing.
1. See Welch Suggs, Fight Over NCAA Standards Reflects Long-StandingDilemma,
,HRON. OF HICHn= EUC., Apr. 9,199, at A48.
2. See Harold J. Vanderzwaag, Athletics: Academic Standardsfor FreshmanEligibility, POL'y DEV. IN SPORT MGMT., 1998, at 42. Proposition 48 stated that studentathletes were academically eligible for collegiate athletics if they maintained a minimum grade-point average of 2.0 on a 4.0 scale in eleven academic courses including three years of English, two years of mathematics, two years of social science,
and two years of natural or physical science. See id. Student-athletes were also
required to achieve a combined SAT score of 700 or a 15 composite score on the
ACT. See id. For a discussion of the NCAA's academic requirements for studentathletes under Proposition 48, see infra notes 19-60 and accompanying text.
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ing academic quality was the passage of Proposition 163 in 1996,
increasing the minimum grade-point average ("GPA") and Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") or American College Test ("ACT") score
a student-athlete must achieve in order to be academically eligible
for collegiate athletics. Proposition 16 involves two of the most passionately contested issues in the history of college athletics, namely,
freshmen eligibility and academic standards. Little doubt exists
that its implementation will have significant implications for collegiate athletics.
A.

History of the NCAA

In response to public criticism of the brutality of football, the
NCAA evolved from the Intercollegiate Athletic Association, which
was created in 1906 by a group of thirty-eight institutions. 4 "The
NCAA is a voluntary, unincorporated association of approximately
1200 members consisting of colleges and universities, conferences
and associations, and other educational institutions." 5 For purposes of bylaw legislation and competition in intercollegiate championship events, the active members are divided into Divisions I, II
and III, with further classification of Division I football members
6
into Division I-A and Division I-AA.
B.

History of Academic Eligibility

Academic standards for Division I athletes sharply declined in
the early 1970s. 7 Before then, the academic eligibility of a studentathlete was determined by the "1.6 rule," meaning that athletes
were required to have a high school GPA and SAT score in a combination that would predict a 1.6 GPA as a college freshman. 8 In addition, some of the conferences, including the Atlantic Coast
Conference, required additional minimum scores or standards such
as a combined SAT score of at least 800. 9 In 1972, the "1.6 rule" was
abolished, and, in effect, this eliminated all academic standards for
3. For a discussion of the NCAA's academic requirements for student-athletes
under Proposition 16, see infra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
4. See Deborah A. Katz, What are the "Bases" in University Athletics? Comment on
"Athletic Reform: Missing the Bases in University Athletics," 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 611, 61112 (1991).
5. Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
6. See id.
7. See Art Padilla, Educating the Athlete, 22 J.C. & U.L. 37, 37 (1995).
8. See id.
9. See id.
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entering freshmen athletes. 10 Essentially, a prospective student-athlete only needed to graduate from high school in order to participate in college sports, doing little to dispel the stereotypical "dumb
jock" image associated with the college athlete. 1 In addition, beginning in 1974, freshmen were allowed to compete in varsity competition in revenue-producing sports such as football and men's
basketball. 12 Concurrently, the first stories about hardship cases,
13
recruitment scandals, and academic exploitation surfaced.
One survey during the 1980s revealed that among one hundred Division I schools, thirty-five institutions reported graduation
rates under twenty percent for their male basketball players, and
4
fourteen institutions had the same rate for their football players.'
A consensus among researchers developed that students-athletes,
especially minority student-athletes, were being exploited for their
athletic talent while their academic endeavors were being pushed
aside. Other sport researchers identified similar concerns regard5
ing the college's treatment of African-American athletes.'
The NCAA also needed to create a level playing field of student-athletes among the different institutions within the boundaries of the established academic criteria.' 6 The NCAA realized that
if athletics were to be mainstreamed in the institution's overall educational mission, trustees, presidents, administrators and faculty
shared the responsibility of assuring coherent policy and program
17
integrity.

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Padilla, supra note 7, at 37.
13. See id.
14. See Douglas Lederman, College Athletes Graduateat Higher Rate Than Other
Students, But Men's BasketballPlayers Lag FarBehind, Survey Finds, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 27, 1991, at Al.

15. See Douglas Lederman, NCAA Study Compares Records of Black, White Athletes,
CHRoN. OF H.G.E. Enuc., uly 10, 1999, atA 0. Dr. Richard

nnchck Director of

Northeastern University's Center for the Study of Sport in Society, reported the
troubling facts that 42.5% of the African-American athletes left college in poor
academic standing; 28.2% dropped out of school in their fourth or fifth year, compared to 10.7% of Caucasian athletes. See id. Lapchick also suggested "that a
disproportionate number of black athletes were kept on a non-graduation track, so
by the time their eligibility expired, they seemed so far from graduating that they
may have chosen to drop out because of a lack of hope." Id.
16. See id.; Andrew Bagnato, A ban on malefreshmen would mean... The kids can't
play, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1999, at C7.
17. See Theodore Hesburgh, Reform and Renewal in College Sports, 22J.C. & U.L.
63, 67 (1995).
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GUIDELINES FOR FRESHMEN

In order to counteract these negative statistics, a number of
university officials, together with and as part of the NCAA, decided
to create academic guidelines for the admission of freshmen athletes to colleges and universities. The major reason for enacting
these guidelines was to preserve the academic integrity of each institution, and the goal of each school was to enroll student-athletes
who were likely to graduate with an academic degree. 18
A.

Proposition 48

Initially, the NCAA developed the "1.6 rule" requiring universities to regulate athletic eligibility of those student-athletes who were
predicted to achieve a minimum 1.6 GPA average during their
freshman year of college.1 9 However, a critical weakness of this subjective benchmark was that the established predictions for each university were profoundly different for each institution.20 Therefore,
to eliminate this disparity among universities, the NCAA discarded
the "1.6 rule" in 1972 in the hopes of determining more uniform
21
eligibility standards for student-athletes.
In a dual effort to alleviate the public outcry against academically unqualified athletes participating in intercollegiate sports and
to establish an academic platform for freshmen eligibility, the
landmark legislation, Proposition 48, was conceived in 1983.22 The
intent of this proposal was twofold. First, an emphasis was placed
on increasing the graduation rate of those student-athletes specifically competing in the revenue-generating sports of football and
18. See Robert N. Davis, Athletic Reform: Missing the Bases in University Athletics,
20 CAP. U. L. REV. 597, 609 (1991).

19. See Suggs, supra note 1, at A48.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Padilla, supra note 7, at 38. This action actually transpired over a decade from 1972 to 1982, as a group of leaders met to initiate the foundations of
reform. See id. These efforts ultimately led to the establishment of what is now
called the NCAA's President's Commission. The NCAA's President's Commission
introduced two initial proposals at the NCAA's January 1983 convention: (1) an
initial eligibility standard for Division I intercollegiate athletics commencing in
1986, which would combine a minimum GPA in a core curriculum of high school
courses with minimum standardized test scores; and (2) an eligibility standard for
varsity competition after the freshman year that to remain eligible, a student athlete would, in addition to meeting all existing NCAA requirements, have to be
progressing towards a baccalaureate degree and be in good academic standing,
which would have to be certified by appropriate academic authorities. See id.
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men's basketball. 23 Second, efforts were made to ensure that student-athletes were not being counseled into courses primarily designed to safeguard their eligibility with little or no concern for

their progress toward graduation. 24 Proposition 48, which took effect in 1986, required all prospective high school student-athletes
being considered for a college athletic scholarship to possess a 2.0
GPA minimum in eleven high school core classes and a standard-

ized test score above a 700 on the SAT or 15 on the composite
ACT. 25 Consequently, if the criteria were not satisfied, the athlete

26
would be ineligible to participate for one academic year.
To understand the NCAA legislation that culminated in 1996
with Proposition 16, it is important to understand some of the reasoning behind Proposition 48's passage. Proposition 48 warned
high schools with potential Division I student-athletes to pay closer
attention to their students' academic preparation if the students anticipated having maximum eligibility while in college. 2 7 In addition, this legislation was designed to give these athletes a better
chance of obtaining college degrees and to end the exploitation of
talented athletes (primarily African-Americans) that was common28
place at so many Division I institutions until this time.

1. Proponents of Proposition 48
"In 1985, the year before Proposition 48 went into effect, forty
to sixty percent of the freshmen entering the average Division I-A
football or men's basketball programs scored below 700 on the
SAT." 29 In 1986, the first year Proposition 48 went into effect, the

percentage dropped to nearly zero.3 0 In addition, according to
NCAA data, while the participation of African-American studentathletes initially declined after enacting Proposition 48, within four
years their participation rate increased to the levels previously held
23. See Letter from Robert H. Atwell, Vice President of ACE on behalf of the
President's Committee on Collegiate Athletics, to Chief Executive Officers of ACE
Member Institutions 4 (Dec. 22, 1982).
24. See id.
25. See Karla Haworth, Comment: FederalJudge Bars NCAA From Using Eligibility
Rule Based on Test Scores, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 1999, at A46.
26. See Frank W. Carsonie, Educational Values: A Necessity for Reform of Big-Time
IntercollegiateAthletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 661, 669 (1991).
27. See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at A48.
28. See id.
29. Padilla, supra note 7, at 38.
30. See id.
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before the enactment of Proposition 48. 31 Finally, their graduation
32
rates also increased.
Supporters of increased academic eligibility standards believed
that if the academic standards and expectations of student-athletes
were raised, the athletes would meet them. 33 According to supporters, Proposition 48 forced high schools to be more cognizant of
preparing students academically. 34 Therefore, if a student-athlete
were not sufficiently prepared academically, the result was the loss
of one year of athletic eligibility when that student-athlete reached
a Division I college or university.3 5 Advocates believed that a year of
nonparticipation in athletics helped the student-athlete get "seasoned" to college life and gave him or her an opportunity to "catchup" on courses he or she either lacked or failed in the past. 3 6

Another argument in support of increased academic eligibility
standards dealt with the increased graduation rates of those student-athletes initially affected by the implementation of Proposition
48.

37

Supporters acknowledged that higher admissions standards

did improve graduation numbers. 38 Specifically, according to
NCAA statistics for African-American male student-athletes entering college in 1985, thirty-four percent graduated after five years;
for those entering college in 1988, the graduation rate rose to forty39
two percent-an increase of approximately twenty-four percent.
For African-American female student-athletes the graduation rate
increases were even higher, from forty-four percent for the 1985
entering class to fifty-eight percent for the 1988 entering class-an
40
increase of almost thirty-two percent.
2.

Opponents of Proposition 48

Supporters of the academic eligibility standards, such as the
American Council on Education ("ACE"), and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Problems of Major Intercollegiate Athletic Programs,
suggested that the dual purpose of the changes in academic standards was to "assert the supremacy of academic values" in college
31. See id.

32. See id.
33. See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 51.
34. See id. at 52.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Andrew Bagnato, Prop 16 ruling has NCAA spinning in its own reforms,
CHi. TRIB., July 22, 1999, at C3.
39. See Padilla, supra note 7, at 38.
40. See id.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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sports and to "preserve the integrity of the NCAA and their institutions."'4' Opponents, however, objected not only to the test score
standard, but also to the manner in which the proposal was drafted
and the negative effects it had on certain minority groups. 42 Much
of the opposition was led by the presidents of predominantly African-American institutions who believed that the proposal was inherently discriminatory. 43 Jesse Stone, Jr., President of Southern
University, described the proposal as "patently racist." 44 These critics pointed to the lack of representation by historically black institutions and African-American representatives on the Ad Hoc
Committee that formulated the new eligibility rules. 45 In fact, the
decision of the NCAA to adopt the new initial eligibility standards
affected a number of different groups, all of which were excluded
from the rule development process in the Ad Hoc Committee. 4 6
Another major criticism of Proposition 48 focused on the controversial issue of whether the academic standard was racially biased. According to a study conducted by the McIntosh Commission
for Fair Play, Proposition 48 eliminated a substantial number of student-athletes who otherwise would have graduated from various
universities under different guidelines. 47 This research reported
that forty-five percent of African-American students who actually
graduated would have been subsequently eliminated if adherence
to the new stipulations was enforced. 48 Therefore, as a result of the
adoption of Proposition 48, the number of African-American freshmen student-athletes participating on Division I athletic teams
41. Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism? 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 101, 103-04 (1984) (citing Letter from Derek C. Bok,
President of Harvard University and Chairman of Ad Hoc Committee, & J. W.
Peltason, President of ACE, to NCAA Division I members (undated)).
42. See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 43.
43. See id.

44. See id.
45. See Greene, supra note 41, at 112.
46. See id. "The groups affected included blacks, who have historically been
disadvantaged by standardized testing, the historically black colleges, which have
always disproportionately educated young black people as well as afforded dine a
quality athletic experience, and secondary educational institutions." Id. In addition, the NCAA affected other groups' core curriculum requirements, including
testing services that design and administer the tests used for determining academic
eligibility. See id. at 112-13. The NCAA also affected potential collegiate athletes,
including those who may be excluded from competition as well as those who are
included but whose competitive and associative opportunities are lessened as a
result of the new rules. See id.
47. See MCINTOSH COMMISSION FOR FAIR PLAY IN STUDENT-ATHLETE ADMISSIONS, REPORT 1 (1994) [hereinafter MCINTOSH REPORT].
48. See Charles Rooney, Test-Score Requirement for Student Athletes, CHRON. OF
HIGHER

EDUC., Oct. 6, 1995, at B4.
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plummeted eighteen percent from the previous year. 49 Over the
same time period, the representation of Caucasian athletes saw a
moderate increase.

50

However, the focal point of the criticism of Proposition 48 was
the use of the SAT and ACT to establish minimum initial eligibility
standards.5 1 George Hanford, the President of the College Board,
which administers the SAT, stated:
It is an undisputed fact that minority candidates earn significantly lower scores on the average because many of
them are less privileged educationally and socio-economically than whites. Proposition 48 will have a differentially
severe impact on the aspiring athletes among blacks, but
not because of bias in the SAT, but because of the educational deficit that exists in this country. So, it is obvious
that the use of SATs to help set minimum academic standards for freshmen is patently discriminatory and racist in
52
its effects. Its use is a disservice to minority athletes.
A second problem with the use of the SAT minimum test score
was that the use of this standard violated the scientific and philosophical principles upon which the SAT was based. 53 For example,
the designation of 700 or 900 as the minimum standard ignored the
SAT's standard deviation of 50 points. 54 Therefore, statistically
speaking, a score of 650 or 750 on the SAT should be treated
55
equally. Despite this, the NCAA treated them vastly different.
Further, the SAT was meant only to help predict how well students
would perform academically in the first year of college. 56 George
Hanford again summarized by stating:
Under the NCAA rule, the SAT [is] used for a purpose
which it was neither intended nor designed to serve-determining athletic eligibility rather than college admission, and . .

.

the way SAT scores are being used in

establishing athletic eligibility is contrary to the College
49. See MCINTOSH

REPORT,

supra note 47, at 1. But see Padilla, supra note 7, at

38.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See MCINToSH REPORT, supra note 47, at 1.

See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 49.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 49.
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Board's guidelines with respect to the use of test scores in
57
making college admissions decisions.
Critics of Proposition 48 cited evidence from a new study that
showed there was no statistical or educational rationale for using
standardized test scores as an absolute cutoff for eligibility. 5 8 From
the outset, advocates of African-American student-athletes have argued that the tests were culturally biased, while testing-company officials have insisted that their tests were never intended to serve as
an absolute cutoff.5 9 Even many of the rule's supporters acknowledge that the decision to set the eligibility cutoff at 700 was not
60
based on empirical knowledge.
B.

Proposition 16

Proposition 48 was revised at the NCAA Convention in 1989
and became Proposition 42.61 Essentially, Proposition 42 changed
Proposition 48 by stating that a "partial qualifier," a student-athlete
who achieved one of the benchmarks, either a 2.0 GPA or a 700 on
the SAT or 15 on the ACT, "may receive institutional financial aid
that is not from an athletic source and is based on financial need
only, consistent with institutional regulations, during the first academic year."6 2 A "nonqualifier," a student-athlete who achieved
neither the GPA nor SAT/ACT benchmarks, "shall not be eligible
for... institutional financial aid during the first academic year. '63
In essence, Proposition 42 changed Proposition 48 by denying athletic-based financial aid to recruited Proposition 48 student-athletes
64
during the freshman year.
Subsequently, at the 1992 NCAA Convention, Proposition 48
was again revised into what is now known as Proposition 16.65 This
change, which took effect in August 1996, strengthened Proposition 48 in two ways. 6 6 First, the required number of core curriculum courses was raised from eleven to thirteen, meaning studentathletes must take two more courses in English, math, or natural
sciences, and second, the minimum GPA was raised from 2.0 to
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
See Lederman, supra note 15, at A30.
See id.
See id.

61.
62.
63.
64.

See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 44.
NCAA, 1995-1996 NCAA MnNuA_ 138 (1995).
Id. at 139.
See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 45.

65. See id.
66. See id.
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2.5.67 The implementation of Proposition 16 in the 1996-1997 academic year introduced an initial eligibility index or "sliding scale,"
which enabled a student-athlete to remain eligible despite having a
GPA below 2.5 if the SAT or ACT was comparatively higher than
700 or 18, respectively. 68 By using the sliding index, the studentathlete could establish academic eligibility with a GPA as low as
2.00, provided the student also achieved a SAT score of 1010 or an
ACT sum (as opposed to composite) score of 86.69 Conversely, a
minimum SAT score of 820 or ACT sum score of 68 established the
eligibility floor for students with GPAs of 2.50 or higher. 70 Therefore, a student-athlete not qualifying under the standards of Proposition 16 may become a partial qualifier by presenting an SAT
score between 720 and 810 (ACT score between 59 and 67) and a
core GPA that produces a GPA-test combination score comparable
to that required of qualifiers. 7 1 Although partial qualifiers cannot
compete in intercollegiate athletics, they may otherwise be eligible
72
for athletically-related financial aid.
A comparison of the eligibility standards governed by Propositions 48 and 16 is found below.

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
70. See id. Statistically speaking, the ensuing effect of Proposition 16 was to
modify Proposition 48 by increasing the weight assigned to test scores relative to
GPAs. See id. While the minimum core GPA of 2.0 was established at two standard
deviations below the national mean, the SAT/ACT test cutoff scores were set only
one standard deviation below the national mean, resulting in a heavier weighting
of the standardized test. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. In 1995, the NCAA also passed a provision permitting partial qualifiers to receive institutional financial aid, including athletically-related aid, effective in August 1996. See Vanderzwaag, supra note 2, at 45. Another provision was
passed that allowed partial qualifiers to practice the sport on campus, but not compete, during their first academic year in residence. See id. A final provision permitted non-qualifiers to receive institutional financial aid based on financial need
rather than from an athletic source. See id.
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TABLE 1
Eligibility Standards of Propositions 48 and 1673
GPA
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.1
2.0

Proposition 48
SAT
700
740
780
820
860
900

Proposition 16
SAT
820
860
900
940
970
1010

A comprehensive research project conducted by The National
Center for Education Statistics examined how Proposition 16 academically impacted high school seniors.7 4 The primary purpose of
this report was to observe high school seniors and then identify the
number of students who met the new NCAA requirements. 75 This
report highlighted both senior athletes and non-athletes from the
1992 graduating class to compare how their eligibility would be affected by implementing these new academic standards.7 6 These requirements were applied to the transcripts of a sample of 1992 high
school seniors who: (1) had graduated with their respective high
school class on schedule; (2) had applied for college admission;
and (3) had previously taken the SAT and/or ACT college entrance
examinations. 77 Students who met these three conditions were referred to as "college-bound." 78 Subsequent findings from this study
revealed that:
" A majority (83.2%) of 1992 college-bound high school seniors who met the NCAA Proposition 48 freshmen eligibility
requirements for athletic participation as freshmen would
have been reduced to approximately two-thirds (64.7%)
when the rigorous Proposition 16 standards were invoked.
* Approximately one-half of the African-American (46.4%)
and Hispanic (54.1%) college-bound high school seniors
met the Proposition 16 requirements, as compared to ap73. See David Folkenflik, Test Still Takes 3 Hours, But Has Some New Looks, BALT.
SUN,

Dec. 12, 1995, at DI.
74. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., Who Can Play? An Examination of NCAA 's Pro-

position 16, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 7, 1995.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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proximately 67% of Caucasian and Asian college-bound high
school seniors.
" College-bound high school seniors from the lowest socio-economic status levels were least likely to meet the Proposition
16 requirements, with only 42% qualifying to participate in
varsity sports as freshmen.
" College-bound high school athletes met the requirements at
the same rate as non-athletes.

79

Nearly all college bound seniors (96.1%), fulfilled the eleven
core class requirement of Proposition 48.80 However, under the

more rigorous stipulations of Proposition 16, the number of required English classes increased from three to four, the mathematics requirement was revised to explicitly include algebra, geometry,
or a higher-level mathematics course, and another additional academic elective course was also needed. 8 1 Once these variables were
included, only seventy-five percent of the college bound seniors in
1992 met the requirements; thus, under the standards of Proposition 16, nearly twenty-five percent of the 1992 college bound seniors would have been excluded from participating in freshman
82
athletics based on the core course requirement.
In terms of fulfilling Proposition 16, more than two-thirds of
Caucasian and Asian college-bound seniors met the NCAA's academic requirements, compared to approximately one-half of African-American college-bound seniors.8 3 Similar results were also
reported regarding socio-economic status ("SES") .84 Students entering universities from higher SES groups were eligible to participate in sports in greater proportions than those students coming
from lower SES groups.8 5 Lower proportions of minorities, including African-Americans, Hispanics, and low SES college-bound students, met the eligibility requirements for freshman varsity athletics
participation under Proposition 48, and the percentages dropped
even further under the academic requirements of Proposition 16.86
79. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., supra note 74, at 1-2.
80. See id. at 3.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 4.
83. See id.
84. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., supra note 74, at 4.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 5. In separate commentaries, both Burwell and Gough addressed
the impact of socio-economic status on SAT scores. See id. Extrapolating from
1995 data, students with family incomes of $70,000 or more averaged 1004 on the
SAT, while those students from families with annual incomes of less than $20,000
posted average scores ranging from 769 to 813. See id. Nevertheless, the decision-
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The controversial issues generated by the ongoing Proposition
16 debate are not new. Ironically, the changes from the "1.6" rule
of Proposition 48 to Proposition 16 returned the NCAA to where it
was twenty years ago, except that freshmen are eligible to play, and
partial qualifiers may practice on campus. However, the question
of whether Proposition 16's effect created a disparate impact with
respect to the academic eligibility of minority athletes and left little
doubt that legal challenges would soon be on the horizon.
III.

CHALLENGES TO

NCAA's

CURETON v.

PROPOSITION

16

IN

NCAA

In 1997, four African-American students challenged the legality of Proposition 16.87 The students brought suit against the
NCAA for prohibiting intercollegiate competition of freshmen athletes who did not achieve the minimum cutoff score on the SAT. 88
The primary question presented by the plaintiffs was whether Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196489 prohibited colleges and universities, through the auspices of the NCAA, from requiring students to
achieve a minimum standardized test score as a condition of eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics and/or receive athletically-related financial aid during their freshman year. 90
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 16's utilization of a
minimum test score requirement had an unjustified, disparate immakers of academic eligibility legislation refused to acknowledge these statistics
when implementing their proposals. See Bryan Burwell, After a String of Setbacks at
Conventions, Protest Forces Cast an Eye Toward Courts, USA TODAY, Jan. 5-7, 1996, at
A6; see also Russell Gough, Don't Look for Merit in Test Scores, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996,
at B5 (relating that standardized test scores are poor means to determine "merit"
and result in discrimination against poor people and minorities).
87. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding
that plaintiffs made prima facie showing of disparate racial discrimination).
88. See id. Proposition 16 increased the number of required core high school
classes from eleven to thirteen; it also introduced a "sliding scale" SAT index where
a student could compensate for a GPA as low as 2.0 with a higher SAT score. See id.
at 690.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race by any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance).
90. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
previously held that the NCAA is subject to Title VI. See id. at 692 (citing Cureton v.
NCAA, No. Civ.A.97-131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997)).
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pact on African-American student-athletes. 9 1 Consequently, they
were denied recruiting opportunities, admission, scholarship opportunities and the chance to compete in Division I intercollegiate
92
athletics during their freshman year.
A.

Is the NCAA Subject to Title VI Regulations?

Before subjecting the NCAA to Title VI and its implementing
regulations, the court first had to determine whether the NCAA receives federal funding. 93 Plaintiffs alleged three main theories as to
why they believed the NCAA received federal funds.94 First, plaintiffs claimed that the NCAA indirectly received federal financial assistance "because the NCAA act[ed] as the member institutions'
agent with respect to the governance of intercollegiate athletics."

95

Second, relying on Smith v. NCAA, 96 plaintiffs contended that the
NCAA was an indirect recipient of federal funds based on its relationship to its member colleges and universities. 97 Finally, plaintiffs
argued that the NCAA was a recipient of federal funds through its
91. See id. The disparate impact theory encompasses the notion that practices
adopted with no intentional discriminatory motive may operate as the functional
equivalent of intentional discrimination. See id. at 696.
92. See id. at 689. Two of the plaintiffs, Leatrice Shaw and Tai Kwan Cureton,
were senior track athletes at Simon Gratz High School in 1996. Ms. Shaw earned a
3.5 GPA, graduating fifth in a class of 305 students; Mr. Cureton earned a 2.8 GPA
and finished 27th in the same senior class. Despite their high class rankings,
neither student achieved the test score required under NCAA rules to obtain eligibility. Both students were prohibited from competing as freshmen in Division I
institutions. See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d at 107, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing plaintiffs' qualifications).
93. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. 525 U.S. 459 (1999). In Smith, a female graduate student sued the NCAA
for sexual discrimination, alleging that enforcement of a bylaw prohibiting graduate students from participating in varsity athletics at undergraduate institutions
violated Title IX. See id. at 463-64. The Supreme Court determined that the NCAA
was not subject to Title IX requirements because it was not a "recipient of federal
funds" simply because it received dues from its member institutions who received
federal funds. See id. at 459-60. The Supreme Court, however, did not address any
of the alternative grounds proposed by Smith for bringing suit under Title IX. See
id. (citing U.S. v. Bestfoodz, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)). Specifically, the Supreme Court
refused to consider whether the NCAA, either directly or indirectly, received federal funds through administration of the National Youth Sports Program, which
did receive federal assistance. See id. The Court also declined to consider whether
the NCAA was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it exercises controlling authority over its member institutions that received federal assistance. See id.
at 470.
97. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
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Fund") .98

The NCAA responded that plaintiffs' reliance on Smith was
tenuous based on the fact that the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Third Circuit's judgment because the court in Smith
had "erroneously held that dues payments, from recipients of federal funds, suffice [d] to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX." 99
The Supreme Court made a distinction between receiving
earmarked funds, either directly or indirectly through an intermediary, or simply benefiting economically from those institutions receiving the federal funds. 10 0 In Smith, there was no allegation that
NCAA member institutions paid their dues with federal funds
earmarked for that purpose.10 1
The Supreme Court, however, failed to rule on the alternative
theories proposed by Smith to show that the NCAA was a direct/
indirect recipient of federal financial assistance. 10 2 The plaintiffs in
Cureton believed that the Smith ruling did not preclude them from
using any one of those theories to establish that the NCAA received
federal funds sufficient to trigger Title VI coverage. 10 3 Plaintiffs alleged four additional theories to support their claim that the NCAA
was subject to suit under Title VI. 10 4 First, the NCAA was a direct

recipient of federal funds because the National Youth Sports Program ("NYSP") was merely an alter ego of the NCAA. 10 5 Second,
the NCAA indirectly received federal funds because of the complete control it exercised over the NYSP and, therefore, the NYSP

98. See id.
99. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 470 (holding that Third Circuit judgment should be
vacated and remanded).
100. See id. at 465.
101. See id. at 466 (distinguishing between showing of earmarked funds in
Grove City College v. Bell, 464 U.S. 555 (1984)).

102. See id. at 469. The two alternative theories proposed were: (1) that the
NCAA either directly or indirectly obtained federal aid from the National Youth
Sports Program; or (2) when a recipient gave controlling reign to another entity, it
was covered under Title IX. See id. at 469-70.
103. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (explaining that, under Smith rationale,
where plaintiffs could not excessively rely on this theory to prove that NCAA received federal funds). Instead plaintiffs could use this theory in combination with
other facts theories.
104. See id. at 694.
105. See id. The court refused this theory because the district court had previously rejected it. Rather, the court found that plaintiffs again failed to pierce the
NCAA's corporate veil. See id.
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Fund.' 06 Third, the member institutions of the NCAA received federal assistance, and the NCAA governed these institutions with respect to athletic rules.1 0 7 Finally, the member institutions which
received federal funding ceded control of their athletic programs
to the NCAA, making the NCAA subject to Title VI as an indirect
recipient of federal funds. 10 8
In Cureton, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the NCAA was a recipient of federal
funds under the "indirect recipient" or "controlling authority" theories because it indirectly received federal financial assistance
through its complete control over the NYSP Fund. 10 9 The court
reasoned that because there was "a nexus between the NCAA's alleged discriminatory conduct with regards to intercollegiate athletics and the sponsorship of such programs by federal fund
recipients, the NCAA was subject to Title VI for a challenge to Proposition 16."110

B.

Do Minimum Standardized Test Scores Create a Disparate
Impact Among Minority Students?

The disparate impact theory is premised upon the notion that
"some employment practices, adopted without deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."1 '11 One court held that in order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a

plaintiff must prove that the implementation of a facially neutral
selection "has caused an adverse disproportionate effect ...

exclud-

ing the plaintiff and similarly situated applicants from some educational opportunity." 2 Once established, the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove that the disproportionate effect is an "educa106. See id. The court found that while the Fund was the designated receiver
of the block grant, it was only a conduit by which the NCAA made its decisions. See
id.
107. See id.
108. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694. Considering the third and fourth theories, the court found that plaintiffs sustained their burden of proving the NCAA
was subject to Title VI because member institutions gave it control over federal
programs. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 696.
111. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987
(1998)).
112. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989), superseded in part by statute.
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tional necessity" justified under Title VI. 1 13 If the defendant pro-

duces evidence of an educational necessity, the plaintiff may prevail
by discrediting the educational necessity justification or by offering
an alternative practice which, while still promoting the educational
114
necessity, results in a less disproportionate impact.
According to the plaintiffs in Cureton, the essence of the disparate impact was that Proposition 16's cutoff score affected people of
all races differently." 5 Caucasian student-athletes applied to Division I schools in greater numbers and were excluded less than the
smaller African-American student-athlete pool of applicants."16 Additionally, "[fior both African-American and low-income studentathletes, the single largest reason for not meeting Proposition 16
standards was a failure to meet the minimum standardized test
17
score."l
The NCAA emphasized that the opportunity to obtain a college degree was the important issue at stake, not the opportunity to
play sports during an athlete's freshman year. 118 The NCAA also
argued that the ultimate goal of Proposition 16 was to increase
graduation rates among athletes. 119
The NCAA indicated that plaintiffs had not disputed the increase in African-Americans' graduation rates, the narrowing of the
gap between African-American and Caucasian graduation rates, nor
the greater number of African-American student-athletes graduating since the adoption of stricter eligibility standards. 120 The
NCAA argued that "the increased number of African-Americans receiving athletic scholarships relative to their composition in the
general student body was further proof of how college athletics
113. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (applying "business necessity" test used
in Wards Cove for "educational necessity"); see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60.
114. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (citing Wards Cove "business necessity"
test).
115. See id. at 698-99 (emphasizing findings of July 12, 1998 Academics/Eligibility/Compliance Cabinet Subcommittee Memorandum, which showed that
NCAA contemplated dramatic impact on minority student-athletes after adoption
of Proposition 16).
116. See id. at 699 (noting that in Department of Education report, 46.4% of
college bound African-American athletes met Proposition 16's requirements as opposed to 67% of Caucasian college bound athletes).
117. Id. at 698 (explaining expectation that among national student population, more than 15% would be affected by SAT/ACT minimum test requirement
while less than 3% would be affected by GPA minimum).
118. See id. at 699.
119. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 699 (arguing that standards would increase
African-American graduation rates to 59%, compared to 62% Caucasian graduation rate).
120. See id.
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had, in fact, benefited this group." 12 1 Thus, if graduation, rather
than freshman-year athletics, was the opportunity at stake here, the
NCAA maintained that plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate the
requisite disproportionate effect."1 22 The court, however, found
the NCAA's argument unpersuasive, determining that a selection
practice having a disproportionate "beneficial" impact upon a specific group could compensate for any disproportionate adverse im1 23
pact on that same group.
C.

Is Proposition 16Justified by an Educational Necessity?

The NCAA stated that Proposition 16 was implemented in order to raise student-athlete graduation rates and to close the gap
between African-American and Caucasian student-athlete graduation rates.1 24 Therefore, to justify Proposition 16, the NCAA
needed to demonstrate that the GPA and SAT/ACT cutoff scores
bore a "manifest relationship" to the goal of improving student-athlete graduation rates.1 25 The court stated that without factual evidence, the NCAA would not be able to show that such a "manifest
126
relationship" existed.
According to the NCAA, Proposition 16 was "designed to discourage the recruitment of athletically talented, but academically
underprepared students."1 27 Thus, "because graduation rates
[were] the best available measure of the degree to which student
athletes are academically prepared for college, it [made] perfect
sense for the NCAA to look at graduation rates as a way of evaluating a rule's relative success." 128 The NCAA argued that if the goal
of Proposition 16 was valid, it was not unlawful merely because "of
the severity of its adversely disparate impact."129 According to the
NCAA, "[t]he degree of disparate impact [became] relevant only
when the [c] ourt analyzes whether ... equally effective alternatives
exist[ed] that decrease[d] an adverse disparate impact." 130
121. Id.
122. Id. The NCAA supported its contention that using graduation rates was
an appropriate measure of Proposition 16's success since graduation rates best
measured a student's academic preparedness for college. See id. at 702.

123. See id. at 700.
124. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 701.

125. See id.
126. See id.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 702 (citing Defendant's Reply Brief at 10 (Docket No. 11)).
Id. (citing Defendant's Reply Brief at 9-10).
Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (citing Defendant's Reply Brief at 18).
Id. at 702-03.
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Plaintiffs responded that it was not the role of the NCAA to
guarantee that student-athletes graduate, but it was the responsibility of each institution to enact support services, which may positively
affect the student-athlete graduation rate.' 3 1 Additionally, plaintiffs
argued that the NCAA failed to show that narrowing the AfricanAmerican-Caucasian student-athlete graduation rate gap was a legitimate justification of Proposition 16, "rising to the level of educational necessity."1 32 In addition to the lack of support for an
educational institution or for the NCAA to further the objective of
closing the graduation gap, the stated goal was "unequivocally not
13 3
the purpose behind the adoption of the initial eligibility rules.
The court held that the desire to raise student-athlete graduation rates was well-documented in the Record and was a legitimate
goal directed toward eliminating both perceived and actual abuses
with respect to the academic standards of student-athletes. 134 However, there was no support in the Record for the NCAA's objective
of closing the African-American-Caucasian graduation gap. 135 The
court acknowledged that closing the graduation gap between African-American and Caucasians was an educational and civil rights
concern.1 3 6 The court reasoned that "[a]ctually proffering such a
'back-end' balancing between graduation rates as an express objective underlying Proposition 16 was in direct violation of the Supreme Court's prohibition against using a 'bottom-line' defense to
13 7
disparate impact cases involving pass fail selection practices.1

131. See id. (stating that "The NCAA [was] merely the entity [to] whom member institutions [ delegated the task of administering their intercollegiate athletic

programs .. ").
132. Id. at 703. Plaintiffs stated that the graduation gap attributed to more
than test scores and high school GPAs. See id.
133. Id. at 704. Nothing in the Record stated that closing the African-American-Caucasian graduation gap was one of the goals of the NCAA with Proposition
48 or 16. See id. at 705. In fact, African-American student-athletes were already
rrlldti-n
r-t-t e- -- to the ovel
student
popuatn
an'
ta
rate greater
than the African-American students in general since the adoption of Proposition
48. See id. at 703-05.
134. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (stating that counsel for NCAA opened
his oral argument with "the legitimate goal of the organization was to improve the
).
academic performance of student athletes .
135. See id.
136. See id. at 705 (citing Defendant's Reply Brief at 15).
137. Id. The court stated that "the desirable outcome of Proposition 16 ...
[was] simply a collateral benefit of promulgating a rule that set [] heightened
academic standards." Id.
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Does A Manifest Relationship Exist Between Cut-off Scores
and Improved Graduation Rates and Diminishing of the
African-American/Caucasian Graduation Gap?

The NCAA argued that its use of a minimum cutoff score on
standardized tests for the purpose of predicting college performance was appropriate because, according to its own research, "high
school GPAs and standardized test scores [were] a 'significant but
moderate predictor of college performance' with GPAs especially
being a predictor of first year grades and both criterion being
138
predictors of later graduation."

The court held that under the "manifest relationship analysis,"
the NCAA must admit evidence which showed that the use of the
820 SAT and 68 ACT cutoff scores bore a manifest relationship to
the goal of raising student-athlete graduation rates. 139 In addition,
the existing SAT cutoff scores would not be justified if they were not
"a valid measure of the minimal ability necessary to [achieve] the
goal of raising student-athlete graduation rates." 140 Therefore,
some independent basis was needed for the NCAA to choose the
cutoff, such as a professional estimate of the requisite skill needed
or an analysis of test results to locate a logical "break-point" in the
distribution of scores. 14 1 In the end, the court found no such basis
for the cutoff score. 14 2 According to the court, the NCAA chose a
cutoff that appeared acceptable from its consideration of, among
other things, the "essential tension between two conflicting goals:
(1) raising of graduation rates; and (2) allowing more individuals
1 43
access to the finite number of athletic opportunities available."
The NCAA simply engaged in a "wait and see" strategy to see if the
anticipated effects and outcomes would materialize. 4 4 The court,
138. Id. at 706 (citing Satellite Video Conference on Initial Eligibility, held by
NCAA Membership Services (Aug. 19, 1998) (transcript at 21-22)).
139. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 706 (citing Newark Branch NCAA v. Town
of Harrison, N.J., 940 F.2d 792, 804 (3d Cir. 1991)).
140. Id. at 708 (quoting Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp.
1518, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1991)).
141. See id. (citing Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980)).
142. See id.
143. Id. (citing Memorandum of NCAA Division I Academics/Eligibility/
Compliance Cabinet Subcommittee on Initial Eligibility Issues at 4 (July 27,
1998)).
144. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (quoting McCardle Deposition at 42, Exhibit D to Plaintiff's Opening). The court concluded that the NCAA had failed to
justify either: (1) that its choice of a 820 cutoff score was reasonable and consistent
with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency of student-athletes towards attaining a college degree; (2) that its choice of a 820 cutoff score was the logical
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in fact, noted that the NCAA failed to specify what it would consider

"normal expectations of the acceptable proficiency" to facilitate student-athletes' ability to obtain a college degree or what it would
145
consider the requisite ability to graduate.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the NCAA had not produced any evidence demonstrating that the 820 SAT and 68 ACT
cutoff score, under Proposition 16, furthered the goal of raising student-athlete graduation rates. 146 Even if the NCAA had offered evidence sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiffs, the court
concluded that plaintiffs had satisfied their burden by showing that
the adverse racial impact resulting from the SAT cutoff score was
"notjustified by any legitimate educational necessity.'

47

The court

acknowledged "that [a] strong statistical basis exist[ed] for the use
of any particular single minimum score," but that required the
NCAA to perform the appropriate, determinative analysis to substantiate its basis for selecting the 820 cutoff score. 148 Therefore,
the court ordered the NCAA to stop immediately using the minimum standardized test scores as a requirement for freshmen eligi49
bility, indicating that the provision was illegal.'

IV.

CURETON ADDENDUM: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S REVERSAL

In December 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court in Cure-

ton. 150 The Third Circuit held that the language of section 601 of
In other words, section 601 of
Title VI was "program specific."''
Title VI did not preclude recipients of federal funds from discriminating with respect to programs not receiving the federal fund"break-point" in the distribution of SAT scores relevant to meeting its goal of raising student-athlete graduation rates; or (3) that its choice of a 820 cutoff score was
a valid measure of the minimal ability necessary to raise the graduation rates of
student-athletes above those achieved prior to Proposition 16, let alone prior to
Proposition 48. See id. at 710.
145. See id. at 710 (explaining that NCAA supported its cutoff with vague support, such as notion that students who score 820 on SAT have substantial reading
problems).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 712.
148. Id. (citing NCAA, 1992 NCAA Convention Proc. 235 (Dec. 8, 1992)).
149. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 689 (citing Cureton v. NCAA, No. Civ.A.97131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997)) (exercising plenary review of
District Court's grant of summaryjudgment to plaintiff). The Third Circuit noted
that, on appeal, the plaintiffs only challenged the minimum SAT score, not the
NCAA's minimum grade point cutoff. See id. at 109.
150. See generally Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 107.
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ing. 15 2 Therefore, the circuit court held, to the extent that this suit
was based on the NCAA receiving federal financial assistance due to
grants extended to the "Fund," that the suit must fail because the
"Fund's" programs and activities were not at issue in this case. 15 3 As
to the question of whether the NCAA maintained "controlling authority" over their member institutions which receive federal financial assistance, the Third Circuit held that this argument failed as
well. 15 4 The court stated that the NCAA did not control its members.1 55 While it was true that member institutions make studentathlete admission and scholarship decisions conscious of possible
NCAA sanctions, that did not mean the NCAA controls them because the institutions could either accept the sanctions imposed or
withdraw from the NCAA, albeit not the most optimal choices with
respect to an institution's future competition in national collegiate
athletics.' 56 Despite the fact that the NCAA constitution required
its members to forfeit authority over their sports programs to the
NCAA, the member institutions retained control over the individual athletic programs and could make their own determinations as
to whether they would adhere to the NCAA rules and
15 7
regulations.
V.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF CURETON

Until Cureton is finally resolved, a high level of uncertainty surrounding the academic eligibility requirements of collegiate student-athletes exists. Although the NCAA's objective to improve

graduation rates of student-athletes has been well received by college athletic administrators, the methodology used to implement
this objective has drawn sharp criticism. For example, according to
152. See id.
153. See id. at 116 (explaining that issue of whether Fund was alter ego of
NCAA was immaterial because "discriminatory impact aspects of the regulations
only can be applied to the specific program receiving federal assistance and the
Fund's programs are not in issue here").
154. See id.
155. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 116; see also NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181
(1988). The Cureton court supported its conclusion by analogizing to Tarkanian.
See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 116. In Tarkanian, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas
(UNLV) suspended a tenured coach under pressure of NCAA sanctions. See
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 181.
156. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198-99 n.19 (explaining that while university's
"desire to remain a powerhouse" among collegiate basketball schools was rational
reason not to withdraw membership from NCAA.) Just because "options were unpalatable does not mean that they were non-existent." Id.
157. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 118 (emphasizing that member institutions are
autonomous in choosing to admit applicants, hiring employees and deciding what
facilities it would require).
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1997 NCAA statistics, only forty-one percent of male basketball players graduated within six years or less. 15 8 Nevertheless, the NCAA
considered adopting two proposals designed to strengthen the concept that student-athletes are serious about their academics.1 59 Specifically, the two proposals would have enacted the first changes in
NCAA legislation since the association restructured its governing
process, placing university presidents in charge of establishing
160
policy.
The proposal to ban freshmen from participation in collegiate
athletics raises numerous questions. These include, but are not limited to, the extent to how involved the student-athlete would be
with regard to travel, practice and competition. Supporters of an
absolute ban on freshmen academic eligibility argue that allowing
these student-athletes the opportunity to practice and travel would
create a "mockery" of the central argument to limit freshmen participation. Adversaries of freshmen eligibility theorize that studentathletes would ultimately miss the same number of classes, and they
also would be exposed to many of the stresses already imposed on
upperclassmen. 16 1 These revisions should ultimately keep the best
interests of the student, university and college athletics in
perspective.
Although a great deal of the plaintiffs' arguments focused on
Title VI regulations and whether Proposition 16 had a disparate impact on African-American student-athletes, one variable of significant magnitude has been overlooked. The NCAA's Rule Change
Memorandum contains the following statement:
Low-income student-athletes also have been impacted to a
greater degree than other student-athletes by Proposition
16 standards. For example, in 1997, 18 percent of all student-athletes with a self-reported family income below
$30,000 failed to qualify, whereas only 2.5 percent of student-athletes with a family income greater than $80,000
62
failed to qualify.'
158. See Welch Suggs, NCAA Considers Ideas to Improve Athletes'Academic Performance, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 25, 1999, at A53.

159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Cureton, 198 F.3d at 119 (McKee, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part) (discussing importance of remembering grave social context which has been
lost due to its irrelevancy in legal analysis).
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Therefore, Proposition 16 has a disparate impact on economically deprived student-athletes regardless of race. 163 The dynamics of
the disparate impact in Cureton appears to be entrenched in the
dynamics of socio-economic status. That is, the issues encompassing Proposition 16 are not issues of race, but of class. If they are
poor, student-athletes are more likely to be adversely affected by
Proposition 16, regardless of whether they are African-American or
Caucasian. The effect of Proposition 16 is that student-athletes who
have attended wealthy high schools and come from wealthier families who help prepare them for the SAT or ACT exam are more
likely to have an advantage under Proposition 16.164 Moreover, the
economic hierarchy of our society makes class and race inseparable
issues. 165
163. See id. (stating that "dynamics of the disparate impact here [were] the
dynamics of socio-economic status").
164. See id. (citing Richard Lee Colvin & Richard Cooper, More Latinos Take
SAT Exam, But Scores Lagging, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at Al).
165. See id. This observation is not intended to detract from or add to the
discussion of the cultural bias that many believe also influences SAT scores.
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